Rong Ding
Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory, Applied Microeconomics.
A pdf version of Research Statement can be downloaded here.
Research Field
Publication
Merchant Internalization Revisited, Economics Letters, Volumn 125, Issue 3, Page 347—349, published in Dec. 2014. [download]
Abstract: Merchant internalization has been proposed as a key reason for biases in the setting of fees in payment card platforms. It has been shown to hold under several specific models of imperfect competition. This paper unifies and extends the existing payment card literature by showing that merchant internalization holds under a very general model of competition.
Job Market Paper
Payment Card Interchange Fees and Price Discrimination, with Julian Wright, working paper. [download]
Abstract: We extend and generalize the existing literature on payment cards in the presence of merchant internalization by allowing a card platform to price discriminate across different types of retailers. Despite the platform's ability to price discriminate, it will set fees for card usage that are too low, resulting in excessive usage of cards. We show this bias does not disappear even if card fees (or rewards) can be conditioned on the retailer the cardholder transacts with and even when merchant internalization is only partial. We thus disentangle the different contributions of price discrimination and merchant internalization in explaining biases in the setting of interchange fees.
Other Working Papers
Patent Competition with Licensing, with Ko Chiu Yu, working paper. [download]
Abstract: We examine the effect of licensing in a patent competition among firms competing in a product market. For licensing auction, the licensor stays in the market when innovation is small and exits the market when innovation is large. Considering duplicating research efforts as wasterful, it is welfare improving to allow licensing when innovation is large and welfare reducing to allow licensing when innovation is small. In contrast, for licensing with royalty, the licensor always stays in the market regardless of the magnitude of the innovation and licensing leads to no change in social welfare.
Technology Licensing with Royalty and Fixed Fee, with Ko Chiu Yu, working paper.
Abstract: In this paper, we examine technology licensing with royalty in a Cournot oligopoly market. We consider the contrast of licensing with fixed fee and licensing with royalty in terms of joint profit and consumer surplus. We show that licensing with fixed fee always yields higher joint profit and higher consumer surplus.